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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problem of resource
allocation in an OFDMA system with single source and M
untrusted users in presence of a friendly jammer. The jammer
is used to improve either the weighted sum secure rate or the
overall system fairness. The formulated optimization problem
in both the cases is a Mixed Integer Non-linear Programming
(MINLP) problem, belonging to the class of NP-hard. In the sum
secure rate maximization scenario, we decouple the problem and
first obtain the subcarrier allocation at source and the decision
for jammer power utilization on a per-subcarrier basis. Then
we do joint source and jammer power allocation using primal
decomposition and alternating optimization framework. Next we
consider fair resource allocation by introducing a novel concept
of subcarrier snatching with the help of jammer. We propose
two schemes for jammer power utilization, called proactively
fair allocation (PFA) and on-demand allocation (ODA). PFA
considers equitable distribution of jammer power among the
subcarriers, while ODA distributes jammer power based on
the user demand. In both cases of jammer usage, we also
present suboptimal solutions that solve the power allocation at a
highly reduced complexity. Asymptotically optimal solutions are
derived to benchmark optimality of the proposed schemes. We
compare the performance of our proposed schemes with equal
power allocation at source and jammer. Our simulation results
demonstrate that the jammer can indeed help in improving either
the sum secure rate or the overall system fairness.
Index Terms—Secure OFDMA, friendly jammer, subcarrier
snatching, rate maximization, max-min fairness
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid deployment of wireless communication systems has
always been engraved with the issue of security of the
transmitted data. The basic reason is the broadcast nature of
transmission which makes the signals vulnerable to tapping
by malicious users [1]. Security of the transmitted signal is
generally considered as a responsibility of the higher layers
which employ cryptographic techniques. This strategy relies
on the basic assumption that the enciphering system is un-
breakable by the malicious users [2]. With growing computing
capabilities, such measures prove to be insufficient and it has
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motivated the research community to explore security at the
physical layer. Physical layer security finds its basis from
independence of the wireless communication channels and
has a low implementation complexity [3]. This added layer
of security is considered as the strictest kind of security, not
requiring even any kind of key exchange [1], [2].
Orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA)
is a potential physical layer technology for the next gener-
ation access networks such as WiMAX, LTE, and beyond.
Hence, the study of physical layer security in OFDMA has
gained considerable attention in recent years [4]–[12]. The
subcarrier allocation and power optimization in multi-node
secure OFDMA system has been studied in two cases: in one
scenario transmitter assumes all users to be trusted and there
exists an external eavesdropper which tries to decode the data
of trusted users [4]–[8], while in another scenario there is a
mutual distrust among the users and a particular user may
demand the source to transmit its data considering all other
users as the potential eavesdroppers [10]–[12].
In trusted users case, the authors in [5] considered maxi-
mizing the minimum of weighted sum secure rate of all the
users. They proposed a complex MILP based solution and less
complex suboptimal schemes. However, the issue of resource
scarcity of a user that is very near to the eavesdropper was
not highlighted. Maximization of energy efficiency with multi-
antenna source, eavesdropper, and single antenna users was
studied in [6] with bounds on per-user tolerable secrecy outage
probability. The average secrecy outage capacity maximization
in the same setup with a multi-antenna Decode and Forward
relay was studied in [7]. The authors in [13] studied secure rate
maximization under fixed quality of service (QoS) constraints
for secure communication among multiple source-destination
pairs in the presence of multi-antenna external eavesdropper,
with the help of multiple single antenna Amplify and Forward
(AF) relays. An extension of the above proposed schemes to
multiple eavesdroppers case may be straight forward, but with
untrusted users the problems present an interesting challenge
with multiple unexplored facets. Looking at another domain of
untrust, subcarrier assignment and power allocation problem
was studied in [9] in an AF untrusted relay aided secure
communication among multiple source-destination pairs.
In an effort to tackle the untrusted users, the authors in
[10] proposed to allocate a subcarrier to its best gain user in
a two-user OFDMA system and presented the optimal power
allocation. The scheme can be trivially extended to more than
two users for sum rate maximization. In a scenario having
heterogeneous demand of resources by users, the authors in
[11] proposed a joint subcarrier and power allocation policy
for two classes of users: secure users demanding a fixed secure
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2rate and normal users which are served with best effort traffic.
In the cognitive radio domain, secure communication over
a single carrier, between multi-antenna secondary transmitter
and a fixed user considering other secondary and primary
users as eavesdroppers was studied in [14]. Similarly, pre-
coder design to maximize the sum secrecy rate to achieve
confidential broadcast to users with multiple antennas was
studied in [15], [16]. The authors in [12] solved the resource
allocation problem among multiple source-destination pairs in
a relay-aided scenario with untrusted users. However, in secure
OFDMA fair resource distribution among untrusted users
poses new challenges which have not yet been investigated.
A. Motivation
The study in [11] raised the feasibility issue of resource
allocation problem because of the channel conditions, i.e.,
some users may not achieve the required secure rate due to tap-
ping by untrusted users. This motivates us to investigate if the
secure rate over a subcarrier could be any how improved. The
strategy proposed in [8] utilizes interference to improve the
secure rate of a user. But this scheme cannot be used in multi-
user untrusted scenario because it relies on a strong assumption
that the jammer affects the eavesdropper only. It was shown
in [17] that, for single user multi-antenna system, secrecy
rate can be improved by a multi-antenna source by jointly
transmitting message in the range space and interference in
the null space of the main channel. Since this solution is
difficult to apply for single antenna systems, the authors in [18]
showed the possibility of achieving a positive rate even when
eavesdropper’s channel is stronger compared to main channel
by using jamming power control only. The studies in [8],
[17], [18] are based on single user system. The implications
of utilizing interference in multi-user scenario are yet to be
investigated. With regard to fair resource allocation without
the help of interference, the strategy proposed in [5], which
balances the secure rate among users, can limit the maximum
achievable rate of the system because of a poor user facing
strong eavesdropping by other users. This leads to system
resource wastage. Effectively utilizing jammer power control
in multiple untrusted user scenario for sum rate maximization
or fair resource allocation raises challenges which to the best
of our knowledge has not yet been investigated in the literature.
In this paper, we intend to explore the role of the jammer
power in alleviating the following issues which plague single
antenna secure OFDMA system with M untrusted users:
• Secure rate achievable by the users can be very low
as compared to the single external eavesdropper case,
because now there are M −1 wiretappers instead of one;
• A large number of users can starve for subcarriers,
because a group of users with very good channel gains
may prohibit secure communication to the other users.
Assuming the jammer to be a node affecting all the users, we
intend to use the jammer power for individual and independent
jamming over the subcarriers. The resource allocation problem
in presence of jammer is a complex Mixed Integer Non Linear
Programming (MINLP) problem belonging to the class of
NP-hard [19], [20]. Due to the requirement of decision on
subcarrier allocation at the source as well as to use jammer
power over a subcarrier, the problem exhibits combinatorial
nature having exponential complexity with number of sub-
carriers [21]. Hence, instead of attempting a global optimal
solution, we study the resource allocation problem to improve
either the sum secure rate or the overall system fairness.
While extending our preliminary work in [22], where we
presented two suboptimal solutions based on sequential source
and jammer power allocation, we conduct a deeper study on
the behavior of secure rate with jammer power and solve the
joint source and jammer power optimization problem. For
max-min fair resource allocation, two novel methodologies
of jammer power utilization are introduced. We also present
the asymptotic analysis of the algorithms with PS → ∞ and
PJ →∞, and discuss the computational complexity of all the
proposed schemes under both the usages of jammer.
B. Contribution
Our contributions can be summarized as answers to the
following two questions:
(1) How to improve sum secure rate in OFDMA systems
with untrusted users? To address this question, we consider the
possibility of using jammer power over a subcarrier to improve
the secure rate beyond what can be achieved by source power
only. The features of the proposed solution are as follows:
• We obtain the constraints of secure rate improvement over
a subcarrier and show that the secure rate in this con-
strained domain is a quasi-concave function of jammer
power, thereby offering a unique maxima.
• The jammer aided approach introduces a new challenge -
referred as SNR reordering in the rest of the paper - which
makes the problem combinatorial even after subcarrier
allocation and jammer utilization decision. We introduce
the concept of constrained-jamming by developing jam-
mer power bounds to handle this challenge.
• For the known subcarrier allocation and jammer decision,
the joint source and jammer power allocation problem is
solved optimally using primal decomposition (PD) [23]
and alternating optimization (AO) [24] techniques.
• We analyze the complexity of the proposed algorithm and
show its convergence in finite steps.
• We also propose less complex solution which allows a
trade-off between performance and complexity.
• Asymptotically optimal solution is derived to assess op-
timality of the proposed scheme.
(2) How to remove subcarrier scarcity and have fair distri-
bution? In secure OFDMA with untrusted users and in absence
of jammer, the best gain user over a subcarrier is the strongest
eavesdropper for all other users. Thus, a subcarrier should
normally be given to its best gain user, which may cause some
users to starve for channel resources. To attain a better fairness,
we propose to take away a subcarrier from its best gain user
and allocate it to another user with poor channel gain with the
help of jammer. The features of the proposed solution are:
• Secure rate over the snatched subcarrier is positive when
the jammer power is above a certain threshold and attains
a maximum value at an optimal jammer power.
3• The conventional max-min fairness algorithm cannot be
employed in secure OFDMA because a user with poor
channel gains over all the subcarriers may force the
algorithm into a deadlock. The proposed max-min fair
scheme offers a graceful exit with such users.
• Two variants of max-min fairness algorithms are pro-
posed where the jammer power can be utilized either by
preserving it for possible snatching over each subcarrier,
or by allocating it based on the demand of snatching user.
• The power allocation is done by PD and AO process
while the issue of signal to noise ratio (SNR) reordering
is handled similarly as in sum rate maximization case.
• Low complexity solutions have been presented for both
the variants of max-min fairness algorithms.
• We obtain an asymptotic upper bound of the fairness
achievable by our proposed scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The
system model is introduced in Section II. The sum secure
rate maximization problem is studied in Section III, followed
by fair resource allocation study in Section IV. Asymptotic
analysis has been presented in Section V. Simulation results
are discussed in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the downlink of an OFDMA system with a
single source (base station), a friendly jammer, M untrusted
mobile users (MUs) which are randomly distributed in the
cell coverage area, and N subcarriers. The jammer, which
is considered as another node in the network (e.g., in LTE-
Advanced it could be an idle relay node), is controlled by
the source to help improve the overall system performance.
Jammer is assumed to be capable of collecting channel state
information (CSI) in the uplink and sending jamming signal
which is unknown to users on the downlink. Since all users
request secure communication with the source, they share their
CSI with the source as well as the jammer. In the present study
we assume the jammer to be located randomly in the cell area.
Source-to-MUs and jammer-to-MUs channels are consid-
ered to experience slow and frequency-flat fading, such that
the channel parameters remain constant over a frame duration
but vary randomly from one frame to another. Perfect CSI
of source-to-MU and jammer-to-MU channel pairs for all the
MUs is assumed to be available at source [4]–[11]. Source
utilizes this information for subcarrier allocation, and source
and jammer power allocation. We consider that a subcarrier is
exclusively allocated to one user only, which has been proved
to be optimal for sum secure rate maximization [10].
Source
Jammer
MU1
MU2
MUM
h1,n
h2,n
hM,n
g1,n
g2,n
gM,n
Fig. 1. System model
The secure OFDMA system with M untrusted users is a
multiple eavesdropper scenario, where for each main user
there exist (M − 1) eavesdroppers. Out of these (M − 1)
eavesdroppers, the strongest one is considered as the equiv-
alent eavesdropper (hereafter referred as eavesdropper). The
secure rate of the main user over a subcarrier is defined as
the non-negative capacity difference between the main user
and the eavesdropper. Let hi,n be the source to ith user
channel coefficient and gi,n be the jammer to ith user channel
coefficient over subcarrier n as shown in Fig. 1. Then, the
secure rate of user m on nth subcarrier is given as [10], [11]:
Rm,n =
[
log2
(
1 +
Psn |hm,n|2
σ2 + pijnPjn |gm,n|2
)
− max
e∈{1,2,···M}\m
log2
(
1 +
Psn |he,n|2
σ2 + pijnPjn |ge,n|2
)]+
(1)
where (x)+ = max(x, 0), σ2 is the AWGN noise variance,
Psn and Pjn are respectively source and jammer powers
over subcarrier n. pijn ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator of absence
or presence of jammer power on subcarrier n such that
pijn = 0 =⇒ Pjn = 0, and e is the eavesdropper. The
non-linearity of secure rate in source and jammer powers
along with the max operator complicate the optimal resource
allocation which will be discussed in the Section III and IV.
Example: Let us consider a symbolic 3 user 5 subcarrier
OFDMA system, with the respective channel gains |hm,n| and
|gm,n| given in Tables I and II. This system will be used to
illustrate the key concepts developed further in the paper. 
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR SUM SECURE RATE
MAXIMIZATION
In this section we discuss the joint source and jammer
resource optimization problem for weighted sum secure rate
maximization. The problem can be stated as:
maximize
Psn ,Pjn ,pim,n,pijn
M∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
wmpim,nRm,n
subject to
C1,1 :
N∑
n=1
Psn ≤ PS , C1,2 :
N∑
n=1
Pjn ≤ PJ ,
C1,3 : pijn ∈ {0, 1} ∀n, C1,4 : pim,n ∈ {0, 1} ∀m,n,
C1,5 :
M∑
m=1
pim,n ≤ 1 ∀n, C1,6 : Psn ≥ 0, Pjn ≥ 0 ∀n (2)
where pim,n is a binary allocation variable to indicate whether
subcarrier n is given to user m or not, wm is the priority
weight allocated by the higher layers to user m, and PS and
PJ are source and jammer power budgets, respectively. C1,1
and C1,2 are budget constraints, C1,3 is jammer allocation con-
straint, C1,4 and C1,5 are subcarrier allocation constraints, and
C1,6 denotes source and jammer power boundary constraints.
The optimization problem in (2) has total four variables per
subcarrier: pijn , pim,n as binary variables; and Psn and Pjn
as continuous variables. Since the problem is a non-convex
combinatorial problem belonging to the class of NP-hard, there
4is no polynomial time optimal solution possible [19], [20].
We tackle the problem by breaking it in parts and attempt to
find a near-optimal solution, which approaches asymptotically
optimal solution (discussed in Section V) as PS and PJ
increases. For this, first we perform subcarrier allocation
without considering the jammer. Next we distinguish those
subcarriers over which jammer can improve the secure rate,
and finally we complete the joint power allocation.
TABLE I
SOURCE-USERS CHANNEL GAINS |hm,n|
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
u1 1.1027 0.3856 0.6719 1.2101 0.7043
u2 0.7423 1.0735 0.6558 1.0006 0.8943
u3 0.7554 1.4772 0.2498 1.3572 3.5391
TABLE II
JAMMER-USERS CHANNEL GAINS |gm,n|
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
u1 3.3624 6.0713 3.4125 3.0584 0.4987
u2 8.1741 7.0607 4.1047 0.9860 1.6860
u3 0.9028 2.0636 0.5605 3.0277 4.5346
A. Subcarrier allocation at source
In presence of jammer, subcarrier allocation at source, i.e.,
pim,n decision is difficult. In secure OFDMA with untrusted
users a subcarrier can only be given to the user having
maximum SNR over the subcarrier. Any change in Pjn may
force the decision of subcarrier allocation to change because
of the possible reordering of updated SNRs (cf. (1)). Since
Psn is in numerator, any change in Psn does not affect the
SNR ordering. This makes the problem combinatorial, as we
may need to check subcarrier allocation for every update of
Pjn . In order to bypass this step, we initially assume that the
jammer is not present. In absence of jammer pijn = 0 ∀ n,
and the secure rate definition in (1) changes to
Rm,n|pijn=0 =
[
log2
(
1 +
Psn |hm,n|2
σ2
)
− max
e∈{1,2,···M}\m
log2
(
1 +
Psn |he,n|2
σ2
)]+
. (3)
As observed in (3), |hm,n| > max
e∈{1,2,···M}\m
|he,n| is required
to have positive secure rate over subcarrier n, irrespective
of Psn . Thus, the subcarrier allocation policy, allocating a
subcarrier to its best gain user can be stated as:
pim,n =
1, if |hm,n| = maxe∈{1,2,···M} |he,n|0, otherwise. (4)
Remark: Note that the subcarrier allocation (4) depends only
on users’ gains. It is indifferent to users’ priority imposed
through weights which will play their role in power allocation.
B. Subcarrier allocation at jammer and jammer power bounds
In the presence of jammer, even after subcarrier allocation
at source is done, the problem is still combinatorial due to pijn .
Any change in Pjn may even jeopardize the earlier decision
on pim,n as described in the previous section. In-order to solve
this issue, we first introduce the concept of rate improvement,
which will help us decide pijn retaining the decision on pim,n.
1) Selective jamming for secure rate improvement: Since
jammer affects all the users, it appears that using jammer over
a subcarrier may degrade the secure rate. But it is interesting to
note that, with jammer power the secure rate can be improved
beyond what is achieved without jammer. For the proof of
concept, let us consider a simple OFDMA scenario having
four nodes: source, jammer, and two users m and e. Let a
subcarrier n be allocated to user m, and e be the eavesdropper.
The following proposition describes the possibility of secure
rate improvement and the existence of optimal jammer power
achieving maximum secure rate over subcarrier n.
Proposition III.1. The secure rate over a subcarrier n having
|hm,n| > |he,n| can be improved if |ge,n| > |gm,n| and the
source and jammer powers Psn and Pjn are constrained as
Psn >
{
σ2(|gm,n|2|hm,n|2−|ge,n|2|he,n|2)
(|ge,n|2−|gm,n|2)|hm,n|2|he,n|2 , if
|gm,n||hm,n|
|ge,n||he,n| > 1
0, otherwise
and Pjn <
Psnαn + σ
2βn
|gm,n|2|ge,n|2 (|hm,n|2 − |he,n|2) , P
thi
jn
(5)
where αn =
(|ge,n|2 − |gm,n|2) |hm,n|2|he,n|2 and βn =(|ge,n|2|he,n|2 − |gm,n|2|hm,n|2).
In the constrained domain of rate improvement, the rate is
a quasi-concave function of Pjn having a unique maxima.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Example (continued): Observing the source gains in Table
I, the best gain users of the subcarriers are u1, u3, u1, u3, u3,
respectively. Users u3, u2, u2, u1, u2 are their corresponding
eavesdroppers. Subcarriers c2, c3, c4 satisfy the condition of
secure rate improvement, i.e., |ge,n| > |gm,n|. Considering the
unit of transmit power is in Watt, let PS = 10, PJ = 10, and
σ2 = 1. Source power thresholds for the three subcarriers are
P thisn = 0.0, 0.0, 6.3263, respectively. Assuming equal source
power allocation over all subcarriers (Psn = 2) and comparing
Psn with P
thi
sn , subcarriers c2, c3 can be utilized for secure
rate improvement while c4 cannot be used. The corresponding
jammer power thresholds for c2, c3 are respectively found as
P thijn = 1.2693, 0.9560. Variation of SNRs of the users and
the secure rate R3,2 of user u3 on subcarrier c2 with jammer
power Pj2 are presented in Table III. As observed, R3,2 with
Pj2 > 0 is higher compared to the value when Pj2 = 0, till
Pj2 < P
thi
j2
= 1.2693. R3,2 has a maxima between Pj2 = 0
and Pj2 = P
thi
j2
, at P oj2 = 0.1027. 
TABLE III
USERS’ SNRS AND SECURE RATE R3,2 VERSUS Pj2
Pj2 → 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.2 1.3
SNR1 0.1487 0.0317 0.0178 0.0033 0.0030
SNR2 1.1524 0.1925 0.1050 0.0189 0.0175
SNR3 2.1821 1.5304 1.1784 0.3571 0.3339
R3,2 0.6988 1.5518 1.4720 0.7239 0.6882
Based on the results described in Proposition III.1, we
create a prospective set of subcarriers, over which the jammer
5power can be used for secure rate improvement. The subcarrier
allocation policy at jammer can be summarized as:
pijn =
{
1, if |ge,n| > |gm,n|
0, otherwise.
(6)
While extending the result of Proposition III.1 to M > 2,
there is an inherent challenge associated with the allocation
of Pjn , which we refer as SNR reordering. Without loss of
generality, let the channel gains from source-to-MUs be sorted
as |h1,n| > |h2,n| > · · · > |hM,n| over a subcarrier n such that
user 1 is assigned the subcarrier and user 2 is the eavesdropper.
While optimizing source and jammer powers jointly, any
update in Psn does not disturb the resource assignments, but
as Pjn is updated it raises the following two concerns:
(i) User 1 may not have the maximum SNR.
(ii) User 2 may not remain the corresponding eavesdropper.
Because of this SNR reordering challenge, for every Pjn
update a new main user and the corresponding eavesdropper
are to be determined. This is the problem introduced by the
max operator appearing in the rate definition (1), which makes
the joint source and jammer power allocation a tedious task
even after {pim,n} and {pijn} allocation. In order to address
this challenge we develop a strategy as described below.
2) Bounds on jammer power to avoid SNR reordering:
In order to handle the max operator, we enforce certain
constraints over jammer power so as to retain the same main
user and the same eavesdropper throughout the jammer power
allocation. In order to retain the eavesdropper, the rate of user
e should be larger than all other possible eavesdroppers, i.e.,
Psn |he,n|2
σ2 + Pjn |ge,n|2
>
Psn |hk,n|2
σ2 + Pjn |gk,n|2
, k ∈ {1, · ·M} \ {m, e}.
(7)
Similarly, to preserve the main user we need to have:
Psn |hm,n|2
σ2 + Pjn |gm,n|2
>
Psn |he,n|2
σ2 + Pjn |ge,n|2
. (8)
The constraints in (7) and (8) depend on channel conditions
only, which result in lower and upper bounds over Pjn such
that Pujk,n > Pjn > P
l
jk,n
. Since (5) enforces another upper
bound on Pjn , the final lower and upper bounds are given as
P ljn = maxk
{P ljk,n}; Pujn = mink {P
thi
jn
, Pujk,n} (9)
Remark: Since |hm,n| > |he,n| > |hk,n|, hence (7) and (8)
may result only in upper bounds, and lower bounds are zero.
In case P ljn > P
u
jn
, there is no feasible region for Pjn and
subcarrier n cannot be considered for rate improvement.
Example (continued): The SNR reordering issue can be
explained with the help of jammer power variation over
subcarrier c3. The respective SNRs of the users with Pj3
variation are presented in Table IV. From Pj3 = 0 to 0.4, u1
and u2 are respectively the main user and the eavesdropper. At
Pj3 = 0.5, the eavesdropper changes from u2 to u3 and this
reduces the secure rate R1,3 from 0.0616 to 0.0315. When
Pj3 increases to 0.7, even the main user changes from u1
to u3, and now u1 is the corresponding eavesdropper. Now,
the secure rate of u3 is 0.0048, while that of u1 is 0.0.
Though the jammer power threshold P thijn guarantees that, if
Pjn < P
thi
jn
, the secure rate remains greater than that without
jammer (Pjn = 0), this assertion relies on the basic assumption
that the main user and the eavesdropper do not change. The
jammer power threshold, optimum jammer power, and its
upper bound to avoid SNR re-ordering on c3 are respectively
P thij3 = 0.9560, P
o
j3
= 0.0808, and Puj3,3 = 0.4013. As soon
as Pj3 > P
u
j3
= min{P thij3 , Puj3,3} = 0.4013, the SNR order
changes and R1,3 is also reduced. This issue did not arise in
c2 as there was no finite jammer power upper bound Puj1,2 . 
After decision of pim,n and pijn , combinatorial aspect of the
problem is resolved if Pjn remains within bounds. Next we
consider the joint source and jammer power allocation.
TABLE IV
USERS’ SNRS AND SECURE RATE R1,3 VERSUS Pj3
Pj3 → 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.7
SNR1 0.4514 0.2086 0.0798 0.0662 0.0493
SNR2 0.4301 0.1602 0.0556 0.0456 0.0336
SNR3 0.0624 0.0605 0.0554 0.0539 0.0512
R1,3 0.0328 0.1020 0.0616 0.0315 0.0000
C. Joint optimization of source and jammer power
After the decision on utilization of jammer power based on
Proposition III.1, all subcarriers can be categorized in two sets:
{J0} - the ones that do not use jammer power (pijn = 0), and
{J1} - the others that use jammer power (pijn = 1). Let γm,n
and γ′m,n respectively denote the SNRs of the user m, without
jammer power and with jammer power over subcarrier n, i.e.,
γm,n =
Psn |hm,n|2
σ2
; γ′m,n =
Psn |hm,n|2
σ2 + Pjn |gm,n|2
. (10)
The joint power allocation problem can be stated as
maximize
Psx ,Psy ,Pjy
{∑
x∈J0
w′x [log2(1 + γm,x)− log2(1 + γe,x)]
+
∑
y∈J1
w′y
[
log2(1 + γ
′
m,y)− log2(1 + γ′e,y)
]
subject to
C2,1 :
∑
x∈J0
Psx +
∑
y∈J1
Psy ≤ PS , C2,2 :
∑
y∈J1
Pjy ≤ PJ ,
C2,3 : Pjy > P
l
jy ∀ y ∈ J1, C2,4 : Pjy < Pujy ∀ y ∈ J1,
C2,5 : Psx ≥ 0, Psy ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ J0, y ∈ J1 (11)
where w′n is the weight of the main user m over the nth
subcarrier. C2,1 and C2,2 are the power budget constraints.
Constraints C2,3 and C2,4 are imposed to tackle the SNR re-
ordering challenge (cf. Section III-B2), while the boundary
constraints for source power are captured in C2,5.
The source power has to be shared among the subcarriers’
set {J0} and {J1}, while the jammer power has to be
allocated on the subcarriers of set {J1} only. We observe that
source power is a coupling variable between the power alloca-
tion problem over the complementary sets {J0} and {J1}, and
C2,1 is the corresponding complicating constraint. Since the
6secure rate over a subcarrier is an increasing function of source
power, the problem has to be solved at full source power
budget PS . The optimization problem (11) can be solved using
primal decomposition (PD) procedure by dividing it into one
master problem (outer loop) and two subproblems (inner loop)
[23]. The first subproblem is source power allocation over set
{J0}, and second is joint source and jammer power allocation
over set {J1}. The subproblem-1 can be stated as:
Subproblem-1
maximize
Psx
∑
x∈J0
w′x [log2(1 + γm,x)− log2(1 + γe,x)]
subject to
C3,1 :
∑
x∈J0
Psx ≤ t, C3,2 : Psx ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ J0 (12)
where t, representing the coupling variable, is the source
power budget allotted to subproblem-1. The source power
budget to subproblem-2 is PS−t, as described in the following:
Subproblem-2
maximize
Psy ,Pjy
∑
y∈J1
w′y
[
log2(1 + γ
′
m,y)− log2(1 + γ′e,y)
]
subject to
C4,1 :
∑
y∈J1
Psy ≤ PS − t, C4,2 :
∑
y∈J1
Pjy ≤ PJ ,
C4,3 : Pjy > P
l
jy ∀ y ∈ J1, C4,4 : Pjy < Pujy ∀ y ∈ J1,
C4,5 : Psy ≥ 0 ∀ y ∈ J1. (13)
The two subproblems are solved independently for a fixed
t. Once the solutions of both the subproblems are obtained,
the master problem is solved using subgradient method by
updating the coupling variable t as t := t− ξ(λ2−λ1), where
ξ is an appropriate step size [25] and λ1, λ2 are the Lagrange
multipliers [23] corresponding to the source power constraints
in subproblems (12) and (13), respectively. This procedure of
updating t is repeated until either the sum secure rate saturates
or the iteration count exceeds a threshold.
1) Solution of subproblem-1: Since each subcarrier is allo-
cated to the best gain user (cf. Section III-A), |hm,x| > |he,x|
∀ x ∈ {J0}. Thus, the objective function in (12) is a concave
function of Psx . The optimal P
∗
sx obtained after solving the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions is given as
P ∗sx = f
(
σ2
|hm,x|2 ,
σ2
|he,x|2 ,
4w′x
λ1 ln 2
)
(14)
where f is defined as follows:
f(η, ν, κ) = −1
2
[
(ν + η)−
√
(ν − η)2 + κ (ν − η)
]+
(15)
λ1, associated with C3,1, is found such that
∑
x∈J0 Psx = t.
2) Solution of subproblem-2: In order to solve the
subproblem-2, we observe that the secure rate over the sub-
carriers of set {J1} is a concave function of source power
Psy for a fixed jammer power Pjy , and also a quasi-concave
function of Pjy for a fixed Psy as shown in Proposition
III.1. This motivates us to use the method of alternating
optimization (AO) [24] for joint power optimization, which
alternates between source and jammer power optimizations.
The AO method starts with Psy =
PS−t
|J1| , i.e., equal power
over all the subcarriers of set {J1}, and for the known Psy
optimal Pjy allocation is done. For a fixed source power, the
jammer power allocation problem can be stated as:
maximize
Pjy
∑
y∈J1
w′y
[
log2(1 + γ
′
m,y)− log2(1 + γ′e,y)
]
subject to
C5,1 :
∑
y∈J1
Pjy ≤ PJ , C5,2 : Pjy > P ljy ∀ y ∈ J1,
C5,3 : Pjy < P
u
jy ∀ y ∈ J1. (16)
Since the secure rate over a subcarrier y ∈ {J1} achieves a
maxima at a unique jammer power P ojy (cf. Proposition III.1).
So, first we evaluate optimal P ?jy∀y for achieving maximum
secure rate, respecting the jammer power bounds as follows:
P ?jy =

P ljy + δ, if P
o
jy
< P ljy
Pujy − δ, if P ojy > Pujy
P ojy , otherwise
(17)
where δ is a small positive number. Note that, in secure rate
improvement P ljy = 0 and P
o
jy
> 0, so first case does not
arise. If the condition
∑
y∈J1 P
?
jy
≤ PJ is satisfied, then
optimum jammer power is allocated over all subcarriers, i.e.,
Pjy = P
?
jy
∀y ∈ {J1}. Otherwise the problem (16) is solved
under jammer power budget constraint. The partial Lagrangian
of the problem (16) is given in (18). After setting first-order
derivative of the Lagrangian in (18) equal to zero, we obtain a
fourth-order nonlinear equation in Pjy having following form(
µ ln 2
w′y
)(
ayP
4
jy + byP
3
jy + cyP
2
jy + dyPjy + ey
)
= Psy
(
c′yP
2
jy + d
′
yPjy + e
′
y
)
. (19)
The coefficients of the equation (19) are tabulated in Table
V. In the domain [0, P ?jy ), the secure rate is a concave increas-
ing function (cf. Proposition III.1) and since
∑
y∈J1 P
?
jy
> PJ ,
depending on µ, there exists a single positive real root P rjy (<
P ?jy ) of (19). After obtaining P
r
jy
for a fixed value of µ, µ is
updated using the subgradient method [25]. For constrained
jammer power budget, optimal jammer power P jy is obtained
after constraining P rjy between jammer power bounds as in
(17). Thus, Pjy allocation for fixed Psy can be written as:
Pjy =
{
P ?jy , if
∑
y∈J1 P
?
jy
≤ PJ
P jy , otherwise.
(20)
For a known Pjy , the AO method now obtains Psy based on
(14) with the source power’s coefficient being |hm,y|
2
σ2+Pjy |gm,y|2 ,
instead of |hm,y|
2
σ2 . This completes one iteration of the AO
method. This procedure of optimizing source and jammer
powers alternatively continues until either the secure rate
saturates or the iteration count exceeds a threshold. A PD and
AO based Joint Power Allocation (JPA) scheme for weighted
sum secure rate maximization is presented in Algorithm 1.
Remark: During power optimization in AO, if the jammer
7L(Pj , µ) =
∑
y∈J1
w′y
[
log2
(
1 +
Psy |hm,y|2
σ2 + Pjy |gm,y|2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Psy |he,y|2
σ2 + Pjy |ge,y|2
)]
+ µ
PJ − ∑
y∈J1
Pjy
 (18)
power over some of the subcarriers in {J1} is zero, then these
subcarriers are taken out of {J1} and added back into {J0} for
source power allocation in the next iteration of PD procedure.
3) Convergence of joint power allocation: The source
power allocation is done through PD with (λ2 − λ1) as the
subgradient. The secure rate is a concave increasing function
of source power in subproblem-1 and for a fixed jammer
power, in subproblem-2. Thus, λ1 and λ2 are positive and
bounded. Hence, (λ2 − λ1) is bounded and the method
converges to an -optimal value in finite number of steps [25].
The authors in [26] have shown with the help of Bolzano-
Weirerstrass theorem and [27] that, AO method converges for
a problem which is concave in one set of variable and quasi-
concave with unique maxima in another set. Hence, the joint
power allocation based on PD and AO converges.
Algorithm 1 Proposed Sum Secure Rate Maximization
1: procedure
2: Subcarrier Allocation:
3: for every subcarrier n do
4: find k = arg max
m∈{1,M}
|hm,n|
5: end for
6: Subcarrier set creation:
7: Init J0 = φ and J1 = φ
8: for every subcarrier n do
9: if (|ge,n|2 > |gm,n|2) then
10: compute P thisn and P
thi
jn
11: J1 = J1 + n
12: else
13: J0 = J0 + n
14: end if
15: end for
16: Source and Jammer Power Allocation:
17: primal decomposition begins
18: Init t, itero = 0
19: compute Psx ∀ x ∈ J0 for PS = t according to (14)
20: alternate optimization begins
21: Init iteri = 0;Psy =
PS−t
|J1| ∀ y ∈ J1
22: compute P thisy , P
thi
jy
, P jy and P
?
jy ∀ y ∈ J1
23: allocate Pjy according to (20)
24: allocate Psy with PS = PS − t according to (14)
25: iteri = iteri + 1
26: iterate till either rate improves or iteri ≤ itermaxi
27: alternate optimization ends
28: update t
29: itero = itero + 1;
30: iterate till either rate improves or itero ≤ itermaxo
31: primal decomposition ends
32: end procedure
D. Solution with reduced complexity for rate maximization
The complexity involved in joint source and jammer power
optimization (discussed in Section III-E) can be reduced to a
large extent by allocating source and jammer powers sequen-
tially instead [22]. Initially assuming the jammer to be absent,
subcarrier allocation is done using (4) and the source power
optimization is done using (14). After creating subcarrier set
{Im} of user m (using (6)), over which the secure rate can
be improved, the resource allocation problem is attended with
jammer power allocation. The optimization problem of Pjm,n
(to aid user m over subcarrier n) can be written as:
maximize
Pjm,n
M∑
m=1
wm
∑
n∈Im
log2
1 + Psn |hm,n|2σ2+Pjm,n |gm,n|2
1 +
Psn |he,n|2
σ2+Pjm,n |ge,n|2


subject to
C6,1 :
M∑
m=1
∑
n∈Im
Pjm,n ≤ PJ , C6,2 : Pjm,n < Pujm,n∀ n ∈ Im
C6,3 : Pjm,n > P
l
jm,n∀ n ∈ Im (21)
where P ljm,n and P
u
jm,n
are the lower and upper bounds on
Pjm,n , respectively. If x > y, the inequality
1+x
1+y <
x
y can be
used to convert the objective function into a concave function
which upper bounds the achievable secure rate of (21).
The partial Lagrangian of the simplified problem is given
in (22). Setting the first derivative of the Lagrangian equal to
zero, we obtain a quadratic equation in Pjm,n as:
P 2jm,n |gm,n|2|ge,n|2 + Pjm,nσ2
(|gm,n|2 + |ge,n|2)
+σ4 − σ2
( wm
λ ln 2
) (|ge,n|2 − |gm,n|2) = 0. (23)
The solution P ∗jm,n of (23) is obtained as
P ∗jm,n = f
(
σ2
|ge,n|2 ,
σ2
|gm,n|2 ,
4wm
λ ln 2
)
(24)
where f is defined in (15) and λ is obtained such that∑M
m=1
∑
n∈Im P
∗
jm,n
= PJ . This scheme works fine till∑M
m=1
∑
n∈Im P
u
jm,n
> PJ . When
∑M
m=1
∑
n∈Im P
u
jm,n
≤
PJ , the scheme allocates Pjm,n = P
u
jm,n
− δ which results in
degraded performance. In order to solve this issue we allocate
Pjm,n = (P
l
jm,n
+ Pujm,n)/2. Thus, Pjm,n is allocated as:
Pjm,n =
{
P ∗jm,n , if
∑M
m=1
∑
n∈Im P
u
jm,n
> PJ
P ljm,n+P
u
jm,n
2 , otherwise.
(25)
The suboptimal scheme actually maximizes the upper bound
of the jammer power allocation problem (21). As anticipated
the suboptimal solution referred as JPASO has degraded secure
rate performance compared to JPA as shown in Section VI.
E. Complexity analysis
Here we analyze complexity of the proposed algorithms
for secure rate improvement. The computation complexity of
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COEFFICIENTS OF THE NON LINEAR EQUATION (19)
ay =
(|ge,y|2|gm,y|2)2; by = |ge,y|2|gm,y|2 {2σ2 (|ge,y|2 + |gm,y|2)+ Psy (|gm,y|2|he,y|2 + |ge,y|2|hm,y|2)};
cy = P 2sy |ge,y|2|gm,y|2|he,y|2|hm,y|2 + Psyσ2
{|gm,y|2|he,y|2 (|gm,y|2 + 2|ge,y|2)+ |ge,y|2|hm,y|2 (|ge,y|2 + 2|gm,y|2)}
+σ4
{(|ge,y|2)2 + (|gm,y|2)2 + 4|ge,y|2|gm,y|2};
dy =
(|ge,y|2 + |gm,y|2) {2σ4 + Psyσ2 (|hm,y|2 + |he,y|2)+ P 2sy |hm,y|2|he,y|2}+ Psyσ4 (|gm,y|2|he,y|2 + |ge,y|2|hm,y|2);
ey = σ4
(
σ2 + Psy |he,y|2
) (
σ2 + Psy |hm,y|2
)
; c′y = |ge,y|2|gm,y|2
(|gm,y|2|he,y|2 − |ge,y|2|hm,y|2);
d′y = 2|ge,y|2|gm,y|2σ2
(|he,y|2 − |hm,y|2); e′y = σ4 (|ge,y|2|he,y|2 − |gm,y|2|hm,y|2)+ σ2Psy |he,y|2|hm,y|2 (|ge,y|2 − |gm,y|2);
L(Pj , λ) =
M∑
m=1
wm
[∑
n∈Im
{
log2
( |hm,n|2
σ2 + Pjm,n |gm,n|2
)
− log2
( |he,n|2
σ2 + Pjm,n |ge,n|2
)}]
+ λ(PJ −
M∑
m=1
∑
n∈Im
Pjm,n) (22)
jammer power upper and lower bound for each subcarrier is
O(NM). The PD procedure first optimizes source power over
N1(= |J0|) subcarriers that do not utilize jammer power, in
N1 log(N1) computations [28]. The AO procedure optimizes
source as well as jammer power over the leftover N2 = N−N1
subcarriers alternatively in N2 log(N2) computations. Let us
denote that AO takes Iao iterations and PD takes Ipd sub-
gradient updates for convergence. Then, the total complex-
ity of JPA can be obtained as O(NM + IpdN1 log(N1) +
IaoIpdN2 log(N2)). The worst case computational complexity
when N2 ' N , is O(IaoIpdN log(N)). JPASO initially opti-
mizes source power over all the subcarriers in O(N log(N))
computations and then optimizes jammer power over N2
subcarriers with complexity O(N2 log(N2)). Thus, the worst
case complexity of JPASO is O(N log(N)).
IV. FAIR RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Allocating a subcarrier to its best gain user is an optimal
sum rate maximization strategy in non-secure OFDMA sys-
tems [29], [30]. In contrast, secure OFDMA with untrusted
users in the absence of jammer has in general no other option
but to allocate a subcarrier to its best gain user. This may
cause some users to starve for resources and may lead to poor
fairness performance. The concept of generalized α-fairness
was introduced in [31], where α = 0 corresponds to sum rate
maximization, α = 1 corresponds to proportional fairness, and
α→∞ leads to max-min fairness. With appropriate selection
of the user priority weights, the performance of the first two
scenarios, i.e., with α = 0 and α = 1, can be captured by the
sum rate maximization strategy discussed in Section III. In this
section we explicitly look at the inherent challenges associated
with max-min fair resource allocation in secure OFDMA.
A. Max-min fairness scheme for secure OFDMA
In secure OFDMA the max-min fair resource allocation
problem in presence of jammer can be stated as follows:
maximize
Psn ,Pjn ,pim,n,pijn
min
m
N∑
n=1
pim,nRm,n
subject to C1,1, C1,2, C1,3, C1,4, C1,5, C1,6 as in (2). (26)
In non-secure OFDMA, because of high computation com-
plexity involved in finding the optimal solution, the authors
in [29], [32] proposed suboptimal solutions for the max-
min problem. In secure OFDMA with untrusted users and a
jammer, complexity of the problem increases further due to
the presence of max operator in secure rate definition (cf. (1))
and the addition of two variables, namely pijn and Pjn . Also,
the conventional max-min algorithm [29] cannot be directly
used in secure OFDMA because the algorithm may get stuck
in an infinite loop. In other words, if a least-rate user does
not have maximum SNR over any of the leftover subcarriers,
this user gets the algorithm into a deadlock state in the ‘while
loop’, as its rate cannot be improved. In order to address the
deadlock problem associated with the conventional max-min
fairness in our considered jammer assisted secure OFDMA,
we propose a modified max-min fairness, which uses a novel
concept of subcarrier snatching discussed below.
B. Subcarrier snatching and maximum rate achievability
In non-secure OFDMA, a user is poor if its average channel
gain is relatively low compared to other users. The source
can help such users by either implementing max-min fairness
strategy, or transmitting at higher power, or using both. In
secure OFDMA a poor user is the one who, in-spite of
having good channel gain on main channel, has a very strong
eavesdropper causing its secure rate close to zero. This user
cannot be helped much by increasing the source transmission
power because rate of the eavesdropper also increases with
source power. Thus, with randomly distributed users, source
has very limited maneuverability to help such a poor user.
Below, we introduce the concept of subcarrier snatching with
the help of jammer, which is utilized in the proposed max-min
fair resource allocation (described in Section IV-C).
Let us reconsider an OFDMA system consisting of four
nodes: source, jammer, and users m and e. Let us assume that
over a subcarrier n gain of e is higher than that of m i.e.,
|he,n| > |hm,n|. Originally this subcarrier should be allocated
to best gain user e, but jammer power can be utilized to
snatch this subcarrier from user e and allocate to user m. The
following Proposition describes the conditions of subcarrier
snatching and the existence of unique maxima with Pjn .
9Proposition IV.1. In secure OFDMA, a user m can snatch
subcarrier n from its best gain user e when channel gains are
such that |ge,n|2|hm,n|2 > |gm,n|2|he,n|2 and jammer power
is above the following threshold:
Pjn > P
ths
jn
=
σ2
(|he,n|2 − |hm,n|2)
|ge,n|2|hm,n|2 − |gm,n|2|he,n|2 . (27)
The secure rate achieved over a snatched subcarrier has a
quasi-concave nature, achieving a unique maxima with Pjn .
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Thus, under certain channel conditions, a subcarrier can
be snatched from its best gain user after allocating sufficient
jammer power. The secure rate over the snatched subcarrier is
not a monotonically increasing function of jammer power due
to the interplay between channel coefficients, and source and
jammer powers. In fact, there exists an optimal jammer power
achieving maximum secure rate over the snatched subcarrier.
Due to SNR reordering, (7) may result only in upper bounds
as |he,n| > |hk,n|, while (8) leads to lower bounds (cf. (27)).
Example (continued): Following the strategy of allocating
subcarrier to its best gain user, c1 and c3 can be allocated
to u1, and c2, c4, and c5 can be allocated to u3. Hence,
u2 is left without any subcarrier. If we follow conventional
max-min approach [29], both u1 and u3 are assigned a
subcarrier each in the ‘for loop’, but the algorithm will get
stuck in the ‘while loop’ as the secure rate of u2 cannot
be improved further. If jammer power is utilized, u2 can
snatch subcarrier c4 from u3. We can observe this from the
variation of secure rate R2,4 of u2 over c4 with Pj4 . The
secure rate is R2,4 = 0.0, 0.2186, 0.5646, 0.5652, 0.5649 when
Pj4 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.9, 0.9587, 1.0, respectively. P
ths
j4
= 0.1138
and P oj4 = 0.9587 (cf. Proposition IV.1). Thus, R2,4 > 0
when Pj4 > P
ths
j4
, and R2,4 has a maxima at Pj4 = P
o
j4
. 
C. Proposed modified max-min fairness scheme
Our proposed max-min fairness scheme uses the concept
of subcarrier snatching and also removes the possibility of
algorithm getting locked in ‘while loop’. Assuming equal
source and jammer power allocation in the initialization phase,
the algorithm finds two sets of subcarriers for each user m:
{Bm} and {Sm}. {Bm}, hereafter referred as best subcarriers
of user m, contains those subcarriers over which user m has
the best channel gain, and {Sm} contains those subcarrier
which the user m can snatch from its best gain user with the
help of jammer. The algorithm initially assumes all the users
to be active users, and stores the threshold jammer powers
required for snatching the subcarriers (cf. (27)). A brief sketch
of the proposed max-min algorithm is outlined as follows:
(1) Allocate one best subcarrier to each user in the ‘for loop’
and update users’ rate.
(2) Repeat the following steps till there are active users and
leftover subcarriers
(i) Pick the user with lowest achieved rate
(ii) Find a best subcarrier for the user
(iii) If found, allocate it to the user and update its rate
(iv) Else, check if the user can snatch a subcarrier
(v) If yes, allocate the one with minimum P thsjn and
update its rate
(vi) Else, remove the user from the active users’ list.
The proposed algorithm provides additional opportunity to
a least-rate user in the form of snatching a subcarrier in Step
(iv). The Proposition IV.1 suggests that the jammer power
should be above a certain threshold for initiating subcarrier
snatching. Also there exists an optimal jammer power that
achieves the maximum rate over the snatched subcarrier. Thus,
the utilization of jammer power at Step (v) can be done in two
different ways. Either a fixed jammer power is reserved over
each subcarrier called proactively fair allocation, or jammer
power is allocated based on user demand, called on-demand
allocation. For these two methods we present two different
max-min fair schemes in following sections. The Step (vi),
provides a graceful exit of the algorithm from a possible
bottleneck. It suggests that if a poor user cannot be helped
beyond a stage, the user is taken out of the allocation loop.
1) Proactively fair jammer power allocation (PFA): In this
scheme total jammer power is divided equally among all the
subcarriers, i.e., at each subcarrier there exists a jammer power
budget of P eqj =
PJ
N that can be utilized by any user for
snatching. By reserving the jammer power on each subcarrier,
the scheme attempts to provide equal opportunity of subcarrier
snatching to all the users even on the last subcarrier. The
proposed max-min resource allocation scheme based on PFA
is presented in Algorithm 2. Note that, this scheme optimizes
source and jammer power after every subcarrier allocation.
Per-user source and jammer power optimizations are done as
described in Section III-C with the only difference that, now
the sets {J0} and {J1} contain the subcarriers of one user.
2) On-demand jammer power allocation (ODA): The con-
dition of subcarrier snatching requires Pjn > P
ths
jn
on
subcarrier n (cf. Proposition IV.1). Thus, by limiting the
jammer power budget to P eqj , PFA reduces the possibilities of
subcarrier snatching. The ODA scheme dynamically allocates
jammer power based on user demands on a first come first
serve basis. While optimizing jammer power through AO,
algorithm allocates optimal jammer power (P ?jn) required to
achieve maximum secure rate over each snatched subcarrier
instead of finding P jn (solution of (19)). The proposed max-
min scheme in this case is similar to the scheme described in
Algorithm 2 except for the following changes:
• The algorithm calculates optimal jammer power for each
possibility of subcarrier snatching in the initialization.
• While optimizing the jammer power over the subcarriers
for a user, the algorithm sums up all the allocated jammer
powers of the user and the leftover jammer power as the
prospective jammer power budget. The algorithm then
allocates optimal jammer power over all the snatched
subcarriers and updates the leftover jammer power.
ODA allocates jammer power dynamically, while PFA has
conservative nature, it would be interesting to observe how
these schemes compete in terms of fairness. We will discuss
more about their relative performance in Section VI.
D. Modified max-min fairness with reduced complexity
We now present the suboptimal versions for PFA and ODA.
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Algorithm 2 Proposed Max-min Fair Resource Allocation
1: procedure
2: Initialization
3: U = {1, 2, · · ·M}; C = {1, 2, · · ·N};
4: Rm = 0 ∀ m ∈ U ; . user rates
5: Bm = φ ∀ m ∈ U ; . best subcarriers
6: Abm = φ ∀ m ∈ U ; . allocated best subcarriers
7: Sm = φ ∀ m ∈ U ; . possible snatch subcarriers
8: Asm = φ ∀ m ∈ U ; . allocated snatched subcarriers
9: P eqsn = PS/N P
eq
jn
= PJ/N ; . equal power allocation
10: for every user m do
11: find Bm = {n : |hm,n| > max
e∈{1,M}\m
(|he,n|)}
12: find all n such that |ge,n|2|hm,n|2 > |gm,n|2|he,n|2
13: where |he,n| = max
i∈{1···M}
(|hi,n|) & e 6= m
14: Sm = Sm + n;
15: compute P ljm,n and P
u
jm,n ∀n ∈ Sm
16: find n = arg max
n∈Bm
(|hm,n|/|he,n|)
17: Abm = Abm + n; C = C − n; Bm = Bm − n;
18: update Rm
19: end for
20: while ((U 6= φ) && (C 6= φ)) do
21: find v = arg min
m∈{1···M}
Rm . minimum rate user
22: if Bv 6= φ then . best subcarrier
23: find n = arg max
n∈Bv
(|hv,n|/|he,n|)
24: Abv = Abv + n; C = C − n; Bv = Bv − n;
25: optimize Psn and update Rv
26: else
27: if Sv 6= φ then . snatched subcarrier
28: find n = arg min
n∈Sv
P thsjn
29: if P eqjn >= P
ths
jn
then
30: Asv = Asv + n; C = C − n; Sv = Sv − n;
31: optimize Psn and Pjn , and update Rv
32: else
33: U = U − v . remove the user
34: end if
35: else
36: U = U − v . remove the user
37: end if
38: end if
39: end while
40: end procedure
1) Suboptimal PFA (PFASO): In order to obtain a less
complex solution, instead of optimizing source and jammer
power jointly after each subcarrier allocation, we follow the
strategy of sequential power allocation [22], as described
in Section III-D. Source power over the best subcarriers of
a user is optimized according to (14). Keeping the equal
source power fixed over the snatched subcarriers, the jammer
power is optimized by solving a single user jammer power
allocation problem on similar lines as (21). Assuming {Asm}
to be the set of allocated snatched subcarriers of user m,
the jammer power budget is given as PJ |Asm|/N . Since a
subcarrier can be snatched only when PJ/N > P ljm,n , thus
PJ |Asm|
N >
∑
n∈Asm P
l
jm,n
and hence (21) has a feasible
solution. Till
∑
n∈Asm P
u
jm,n
> PJ |Asm|N , the optimal jammer
power P ∗jm,n (cf. (24)) is utilized. However, when there is
enough jammer power, the assignment is Pjm,n = P
u
jm,n
− δ,
because in snatching scenario the secure rate is positive when
Pjm,n > P
l
jm,n
. Combinedly, jammer power is allocated as:
Pjm,n =
{
P ∗jm,n , if
∑
n∈Asm P
u
jm,n
> PJ |Asm|N
Pujm,n − δ, otherwise
(28)
where δ is a small positive number.
2) Suboptimal ODA (ODASO): It is a very light weight
scheme and does not attempt any power optimization. With
equal source power allocation, every time the algorithm at-
tempts to snatch a subcarrier, it simply allocates the optimal
jammer power (P ?jn) over the snatched subcarrier and updates
leftover jammer power. Once the jammer power is exhausted,
the algorithm either allocates the best subcarrier to the least-
rate user or takes it out from active user set.
E. Complexity analysis
While creating {Sm}, PFA considers for each user the
possibility of subcarrier snatching from the best gain user.
This involves calculation of jammer power thresholds for
snatching, lower and upper jammer power bounds, and optimal
jammer powers required for achieving maximum rate. The
total computation is O(NM2). Denote that a user got N1 best
subcarriers and N2 snatched subcarriers before being taken
out of the resource allocation loop. The joint power opti-
mization procedure has the complexity of O(IpdN1 log(N1)+
IaoIpdN2 log(N2)), where Iao and Ipd are respectively the
number of AO and PD iterations. The total computational
on this user in all the previous iterations is of O((N2 −
1)IpdN1 log(N1) + IaoIpd
∑N2−1
i=2 i log(i) +
∑N1
i=2 i log(i))
which can be upper bounded as O(N2IpdN1 log(N1) +
IaoIpdN
2
2 log(N2)+N
2
1 log(N1)) using
∑n
i=2 i log(i) ≤ (n−
1)(n log(n)) < n2 log(n). The worst case complexity of the
algorithm when N2 ' N is IaoIpdN2 log(N).
The computation complexity of ODA is on the same order
as that of PFA. PFASO has worst case computation complexity
O(N2 logN), because it does not use PD and finishes source
and jammer power optimization sequentially. ODASO does
not perform any power optimization at all, and has the
worst case computation complexity of O(N2M). The worst
case computational complexities of PFA and ODA and their
respective suboptimal versions are summarized in Table VI.
TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF MAX-MIN ALGORITHMS
Power optimization Pj allocation Complexity
PFA Joint P?jn or P

jn
O(IaoIpdN
2 log(N))
ODA Joint P?jn O(IaoIpdN
2 log(N))
PFASO Sequential P∗jn or P
u
jn
O(N2 log(N))
ODASO No P?jn O(N
2M)
V. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we are interested to determine the best
user, the strongest eavesdropper, and the maximum secure rate
achievable when {Psn , Pjn} → ∞ on a subcarrier n. We note
that, for a fixed main user and eavesdropper, a subcarrier can
be used in without-jammer mode or with-jammer mode in
either rate improvement or subcarrier snatching scenario. In
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without-jammer mode the secure rate is an increasing concave
function of source power. In both the scenarios with jammer,
secure rate is a concave increasing function of Psn for a fixed
Pjn , and for a fixed Psn there exists an optimal jammer power
P ?jn which too is an increasing function of Psn . Hence, at P
?
jn
secure rate becomes an increasing function of Psn .
When jammer is not active on a subcarrier, the user with
the maximum channel gain |hm,n| is the main user. But
when jammer is active this might not be true. To find the
main user of the subcarrier when {Psn , Pjn} → ∞, we use
the concept of jammer power bounds discussed in Section
III-B2. Specifically, a user m will remain the main user if
the condition γ′m,n > γ
′
e,n∀e ∈ {1, · · · ,M} \ m gives no
upper bound on Pjn . Denote the effective lower bound of these
conditions as P ljn . We claim that only one user will satisfy
this condition. Otherwise, let two users m1 and m2 be the
contenders. Let the lower bounds on Pjn be P
lm1
jn
and P lm2jn .
Without loss of generality let P lm1jn < P
lm2
jn
. This contradicts
the fact that user m1 can be the main user at Pjn → ∞,
because when Pjn > P
lm2
jn
, m2 becomes the main user.
Let the main user over a subcarrier be m. To identify the
eavesdropper and the secure rate achievable at {Psn , Pjn} →
∞ we follow the following approach. We consider each of the
leftover users as the possible eavesdroppers. Thus, there are
(M − 1) {m, e} user pairs, where e ∈ {1 · · ·M} \m. Over
each of the pair, there exist four cases:
(1) If |hm,n| > |he,n| and |gm,n| > |ge,n|, rate improvement
condition is not satisfied. An obvious decision is to set Pjn =
0. In without-jammer case, secure rate is a concave increasing
function of Psn and tends to log2
( |hm,n|2
|he,n|2
)
as Psn →∞.
(2) If |hm,n| > |he,n| and |gm,n| < |ge,n|, rate improvement
condition is satisfied. P thijn is an increasing function of Psn (cf.
Proposition III.1). Hence, as Psn → ∞, P thijn → ∞. Putting
Pjn = P
?
jn
, the optimal secure rate is log2
(
1+γ′m,n
1+γ′e,n
)
, where
1 + γ′m,n
1 + γ′e,n
=
1 +
Psn |hm,n|2
σ2+P?jn |gm,n|2
1 +
Psn |he,n|2
σ2+P?jn |ge,n|2
a≈
Psn |hm,n|2
σ2+P?jn |gm,n|2
Psn |he,n|2
σ2+P?jn |ge,n|2
=
|hm,n|2
|he,n|2
σ2
P?jn
+ |ge,n|2
σ2
P?jn
+ |gm,n|2
b→ |ge,n|
2|hm,n|2
|gm,n|2|he,n|2 . (29)
The approximation (a), and (b) follows from P ?jn being an
increasing function of Psn , which increases as
√
Psn . Thus,
with Psn →∞ and Pjn →∞ we have P ?jn →∞.
(3) If |hm,n| < |he,n| and |ge,n||hm,n| < |gm,n||he,n|,
subcarrier snatching condition is not fulfilled; secure rate = 0.
(4) If |hm,n| < |he,n| and |ge,n||hm,n| > |gm,n||he,n|,
subcarrier snatching condition is satisfied. The secure rate in
this case is the same as in case (2).
Once the secure rate for each user pair {m, e} is obtained,
the strongest eavesdropper for user m at {Psn , Pjn} → ∞
is the one that causes the minimum secure rate. Thus, with
jammer, for each subcarrier we have the main user, its eaves-
dropper, and the corresponding secure rate achieved.
When the jammer is inactive, the best channel gain user is
the main user and the next best gain user is the corresponding
eavesdropper. The secure rate in this case is: log2
( |hm,n|2
|he,n|2
)
.
A. Asymptotic bound in sum rate maximization scenario
Motivated by the asymptotic behavior of secure rate
and identification of the main user and eavesdropper as
{Psn , Pjn} → ∞, we obtain an upper bound to the maximum
secure rate of the system. To do so, we consider a subcarrier
without-jammer as well as with-jammer, and choose the mode
that offers the maximum secure rate upper bound over that
subcarrier. The system upper bound is then found as the sum
of the upper bounds in chosen modes over all the subcarriers.
To find asymptotically optimal solution for rate maximiza-
tion we note that the sum rate achievable as {PS , PJ} → ∞
is an upper bound to the maximum sum rate of the system.
Hence, the decision of subcarrier allocation and jammer mode
at {PS , PJ} → ∞ is optimal. Keeping the decision at
{PS , PJ} → ∞ same over every finite PS and assuming
PJ → ∞, we find the sum rate that becomes optimal as
PS → ∞. Let the sum rate be RU (PS). As {PS , PJ} → ∞,
relative gap between the rate achievable in the proposed algo-
rithm and RU (PS) at any PS will demonstrate effectiveness
of the algorithm in reaching the optimal point. We note that
at low values of PS , {PS , PJ} → ∞ may not maximize
the sum rate; hence it may be below the rate achievable by
proposed scheme. The motivation behind RU (PS) is that, for
a fixed subcarrier allocation and jammer mode decision, the
achievable maximum rate with finite PS and PJ → ∞ is an
upper bound to that achievable with finite PS and PJ .
B. Asymptotic bound in the proposed max-min fairness
In this case, we cannot use the per-subcarrier secure rate
upper bounds of the two jammer modes. The proposed max-
min fair scheme works on a per-subcarrier basis and updates
rate of the minimum-rate user after every subcarrier allocation.
Hence, if we apply the proposed max-min scheme on the upper
bounds, it may not lead to system upper bound. Also, since
the decision of subcarrier allocation and jammer usage varies
with PS , the decision at PS →∞ cannot be kept fixed.
Instead, motivated by the ODA scheme in Section IV-C2, we
note that as PJ →∞ the fairness achievable by ODA will be
an upper bound to the fairness achieved by any other bounded
PJ scheme. In ODA scheme with finite PJ , the jammer power
gets exhausted very soon. Hence, it allows fewer subcarrier
snatching, which limits its fairness performance. Considering
ODA with PJ → ∞, we allocate Pjn = P ?jn and optimize
source power over all the subcarriers of the minimum rate user.
Thus ODA can now help the poor users to snatch subcarriers
and improve their rates without any jammer power budget con-
straint. The best fairness achievable by our proposed scheme
is given by this achievable upper bound.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Performances of the proposed algorithms are evaluated
through MATLAB simulations. We consider the downlink of
an OFDMA system with N = 64 subcarriers, which are
assumed to experience frequency-flat slow fading. Large scale
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fading is modeled using a path loss exponent equal to 3,
and small scale fading is modeled using i.i.d. Rayleigh faded
random variables. The source is located at the origin and all
untrusted users with default M = 8 are randomly located
inside a unity square in the first quadrant which symbolically
maps to a sector in cellular communications system. Friendly
jammer’s location is varied to determine its optimum position.
For illustration, all users are assumed to have equal weights
i.e., wi = 1, and the AWGN noise variance σ2 = 1. Secure
rate is measured in bits per OFDM symbol per subcarrier.
Equal power allocation: We compare the performance of
our proposed schemes with equal power allocation (EPA) that
utilizes equal source power on all the subcarriers. Respecting
the jammer power bounds developed in Section III-B2, equal
jammer power is assigned over the selected set of subcarriers
following the observations in Proposition III.1 and IV.1 for rate
improvement and max-min fairness scenarios, respectively.
Optimal Source Power Without Jammer (OSPWJ): In sum
rate maximization case, this scheme obtains the optimal source
power allocation assuming the jammer to be absent. In max-
min fair scenario, after subcarrier allocation to a user, source
power over the subcarriers allocated to the user is optimized.
The conventional fairness measure as in [33], that considers
user’s rate as the basis for fairness evaluation, is not meaning-
ful in our context because over a large number of iterations
with random user locations, the users’ rates tends to be similar,
causing the fairness index to be close to unity. Instead, in
order to compare the true capability of a fairness algorithm
in bridging the imbalance in users’ rate, we measure fairness
as the relative gap between maximum and minimum secure
rate allocated to the users by a competing algorithm. In this
case, in each iteration identity of the users are ignored and the
secure rates allocated by the algorithm are sorted in ascending
order and then fairness is obtained from this sorted rate.
A. Rate maximization schemes
We first discuss the effect of jammer location on the system
performance. Four possible jammer locations (0.5, 0.5), (0, 1),
(1, 0), (1, 1) are considered. Fig. 2 presents the rate maximiza-
tion algorithm performance versus source power. With vary-
ing locations of jammer, the algorithm performs differently,
because of the varying degree of impact the jammer has on
the users. Performance at location (0, 1) and (1, 0) are similar,
because these are symmetric locations for the square geometry
considered. Location (1, 1) performs the poorest as the jammer
is too far to have significant effect on users’ rates. The central
location (0.5, 0.5) performs the best, as the jammer is able to
affect all the users and contribute significantly in improving
their rates. Motivated by this, we consider the jammer to be
located at the center in our subsequent simulations.
Fig. 3 shows the secure rate and fairness performance of
proposed JPA scheme with respect to source power at two
different values of jammer power, PJ1/σ2 = 0 dB and
PJ2/σ
2 = 6 dB. The performance of JPA is compared with the
suboptimal version JPASO and EPA. The rate achieved with
OSPWJ is also plotted to emphasize secure rate improvement
with friendly jammer. The performance of asymptotically op-
timal solution (PJ →∞) is plotted as ‘Asymp opt’ to indicate
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Fig. 2. Secure rate versus source power at various jammer locations with
jammer power PJ/σ2 = 0 dB.
closeness of proposed algorithms to the optimal solution.
Sum secure rate and the corresponding fairness upper bounds
as {PS , PJ} → ∞ are also indicated in text boxes in the
respective figures.
Fig. 3(a) indicates that JPASO performs better compared to
EPA because JPASO performs power optimization while EPA
does not. JPASO has a marginal performance penalty with
respect to JPA. Also, the gap between JPA and OSPWJ initially
keeps increasing and then saturates because of diminishing
returns at higher source power. It may be further noted that,
‘Asymp opt’ has poor performance at lower source power
budget, because the decision of subcarrier allocation and
jammer mode at {PS , PJ} → ∞ may not be optimal at lower
value of PS . At finite PS , the possibility of utilizing jammer
power under jammer power bounds over larger number of
subcarriers is more compared to that at PS → ∞. But, as
PS increases the decision of subcarrier allocation and jammer
mode becomes optimal and the ‘Asymp opt’ tries to catch the
upper bound. Since secure rate performance of the proposed
schemes improve with PJ , hence at higher PS and PJ the
performance of JPA tends to that of ‘Asymp opt’.
Fig. 3(b) shows the associated fairness performance. Be-
cause of equal distribution of resources in EPA, its fairness
performance is better at lower source power compared to both
JPA and JPASO. With increasing source power, the jammer is
able to affect more number of users because the percentage of
subcarriers over which jammer can help keep increasing (cf.
Proposition III.1). This results in improved secure rate as well
as fairness performance of JPA compared to EPA.
Performance of the secure rate improvement algorithms with
respect to jammer power is presented in Fig. 4. As observed in
Fig. 4(a) the secure rate of JPA initially increases with jammer
power and then saturates, as the algorithm start allocating
optimal jammer power (P ?jn) achieving maximum secure rate
over the selected set of subcarriers (cf. Proposition III.1).
Due to sequential power allocation, JPASO performance is
inferior compared to JPA. The secure rate saturates at a value
lower than the peak value, because JPASO is oblivious to
existence of optimal jammer power and utilizes more jammer
power than required. Since EPA uses equal jammer power,
the secure rate initially increases, achieves a maximum and
then reduces with increased jammer power. Compared to EPA
which utilizes equal jammer power blindly, the performance of
JPASO is relatively better at higher jammer power, which can
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Fig. 3. Secure rate and fairness performance versus source power at
PJ1/σ
2 = 0 dB and PJ2/σ2 = 6 dB. ‘Rate-ub’: rate upper bound;
‘Fairness-ub’: fairness upper bound.
be attributed to improved jammer power allocation policy (25).
Because of the existence of finite upper bounds on jammer
power (cf. Section III-B2), the rate achieved by EPA also
saturates at higher jammer power but at a relatively lower value
compared to JPASO. The corresponding fairness performance
plots for the various schemes are presented in Fig. 4(b). At
lower source power, EPA performance is better because of
the utilization of equitable distribution of resources, while at
higher source power JPA performs comparable to EPA at lower
jammer power but outperforms at higher jammer power. With
increasing jammer power JPA fairness saturates while EPA
fairness achieves a peak, reduces a bit and then saturates,
showing similar trend as the corresponding secure rate plots.
JPASO first completes source power optimization and then
finishes jammer power optimization over the selected set of
subcarriers, thereby increasing the secure rate imbalance which
results in comparatively poor fairness performance.
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Fig. 4. Secure rate and fairness performance versus jammer power at
PS1/σ
2 = 12 dB and PS2/σ2 = 15 dB.
Fig. 5 presents the performance of the algorithms in secure
rate improvement scenario with number of users M . It may
appear that, with increasing number of users the secure rate
should reduce as the number of eavesdropper increases, but
eventually the secure rate of all the algorithms improves with
increasing number of users because of multi-user diversity.
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Fig. 5. Secure rate versus number of users M at PJ/σ2 = 6 dB and
PS1/σ
2 = 12 dB and PS2/σ2 = 15 dB.
B. Max-min fair schemes
Next we present the performance of the proposed max-
min fairness algorithms in Figs. 6 and 7. PFA and ODA and
their corresponding suboptimal versions PFASO and ODASO
are considered with EPA. The performance of asymptotically
optimal scheme which act as an upper bound to our proposed
max-min scheme has been plotted as ‘Asymp opt’. Fig. 6
presents the fairness and secure rate performance of the
algorithms versus source power. ODA utilizing jammer power
dynamically, allocates optimal jammer power on first come
first serve basis. This results in more subcarrier snatching
possibilities and hence a higher fairness at low source power
compared to PFA. Being a conservative algorithm, PFA is not
able to help many users because of limited per subcarrier
jammer power budget (PJ/N ). Since the optimal jammer
power (P ?jn) for maximum secure rate over a snatched sub-
carrier is an increasing function of source power (cf. (A.4)-
(A.6)), jammer resource gets exhausted very soon in ODA.
Because of this, ODA’s capability to improve fairness reduces
drastically with increasing source power, and correspondingly
its fairness performance starts degrading. ODASO also faces
the same issue of depleting all the jammer resource for a
few initial users and later finding itself unable to help users,
which results in early saturation of the fairness with source
power. In contrast PFA and EPA even if helping a limited
number of users because of their conservative nature, keep
performing well with increasing source power and outperform
ODA at higher source power. While ODASO is able to help
only a few initial users, EPA provides equal opportunity to
all the users. As a result, the overall performance of EPA is
better than ODASO. Though ODA at PJ = 18 dB has similar
performance as with PJ = 12 dB, the plot gets closer to
that of ‘Asymp opt’ as PJ is increased. ‘Asymp opt’ does not
face the problem of depleting jammer resources and keep on
helping users as far as possible, which results in better system
fairness compared to all other bounded PJ schemes. The cost
being paid for higher fairness is the reduced secure rate, as
observed in Fig. 6(b). The secure rate of OSPWJ is better than
all other schemes. However, its fairness performance is the
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poorest because it either allocates the best subcarrier to a user
or does not allocate at all. Because of the dynamic allocation,
ODA allows more subcarrier snatching which results in poorer
secure rate performance compared to PFA as observed in Fig.
6(b). Note that, with the help of jammer the overall system
fairness can be improved significantly (compared to OSPWJ),
however at the cost of a little poorer secure rate performance.
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Fig. 6. Fairness and secure rate versus source power at PJ1/σ2 = 12 dB
and PJ2/σ2 = 18 dB.
The performance of the max-min algorithms versus jammer
power is presented in Fig. 7. For fixed source power, perfor-
mance of ODA as well as PFA keep improving with increasing
jammer power, because of the increasing possibility of optimal
jammer power allocation (P ?jn) over snatched subcarriers,
and finally saturates. At lower jammer power, performance
of ODASO is poorer compared to EPA, because ODASO
is able to help only a few initial users while EPA provides
equal opportunity to all the users. Because of the increasing
possibility of allocating P ?jn , ODASO outperforms EPA as well
as PFASO at higher jammer power. Both EPA and PFASO
are unaware of the existence of optimal jammer power over
snatched subcarrier. As a result, they utilize more than the
required jammer power, leading to their degraded performance
at higher jammer power. As observed in corresponding secure
rate performance in 7(b), secure rate of all the algorithms keep
reducing with jammer power due to increasing possibility of
subcarrier snatching. PFA and ODA saturates at higher jammer
power because of the utilization of optimal jammer power
(P ?jn) by the algorithms. ODASO saturates at a lower value
compared to ODA because ODA uses power optimization
while ODASO does not. Similarly PFASO shows poorer se-
cure rate performance because of sequential power allocation.
The secure rate of EPA also saturates at higher jammer power,
due to the existence of upper jammer power bounds, but at
relatively lower values compared to that of PFASO which uses
better jammer power allocation (cf. (28)).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have considered jammer power utilization in the down-
link of broadcast secure OFDMA for either secure rate or
fairness improvement. We have shown that secure rate can
be improved under certain channel conditions with constraints
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on source and jammer power. Also in presence of jammer,
maximum secure rate is achieved at an optimal jammer power.
While solving the otherwise NP-hard resource allocation prob-
lem in steps, we have used PD and AO procedures for joint
source and jammer power optimization. It has been observed
that sum secure rate can be significantly improved by using
jammer power. In max-min fairness scenario we have shown
that, with the help of jammer a subcarrier can be snatched
form its best gain user and allocated to a poor user who
would otherwise have a low secure rate due to resource
scarcity. To this end, we have presented two means for jammer
power usage: PFA and ODA. Overall performance of PFA is
better. ODA performs marginally better at lower source power
due to dynamic allocation of resources. But at higher source
power, with increasing user demands ODA performs poorly
because of depleting jammer resources for a few initial users.
Asymptotically optimal solutions have also been derived to
benchmark optimality of the proposed schemes.
Possible future extensions include: consideration of multiple
antenna at the nodes, imperfect CSI, finding the best location
of jammer, and multiplicity of jammer. However, in each of
the problems above the combinatorial aspect will open up
new challenges. Imperfect CSI can lead to false decisions
on subcarrier allocation, which may lead to zero secure rate.
Though multi-antenna nodes or multiple jammers will add new
degrees of freedom, the resource allocation algorithms need
to be modified significantly. Optimizing jammer location is an
interesting problem due to users’ mobility.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION III.1
Over a subcarrier n with user m and eavesdropper e, secure
rate improvement implies that the secure rate with jammer
should be greater than that without jammer, i.e.,
log2
1 + Psn |hm,n|2σ2+Pjn |gm,n|2
1 +
Psn |he,n|2
σ2+Pjn |ge,n|2
− log2
(
1 +
Psn |hm,n|2
σ2
1 +
Psn |he,n|2
σ2
)
> 0.
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After simplifications we have following inequality in Pjn :
Pjn |gm,n|2|ge,n|2
(|hm,n|2 − |he,n|2)
< Psn
(|ge,n|2 − |gm,n|2) |hm,n|2|he,n|2
+ σ2
(|ge,n|2|he,n|2 − |gm,n|2|hm,n|2) . (A.1)
Since |hm,n|2 > |he,n|2, coefficient of Pjn is positive. To
have Pjn > 0, right hand side of (A.1) should be positive, i.e.,
Psn
(|ge,n|2 − |gm,n|2) |hm,n|2|he,n|2
+ σ2
(|ge,n|2|he,n|2 − |gm,n|2|hm,n|2) > 0. (A.2)
If |gm,n|2 > |ge,n|2, then |gm,n|2|hm,n|2 > |ge,n|2|he,n|2,
therefore, (A.2) cannot be satisfied for any Psn > 0. Thus,
when the jammer is affecting the intended user strongly
compared to the eavesdropper, secure rate cannot be improved.
If |gm,n|2 < |ge,n|2, the source power Psn is conditioned as:
Psn >
σ2
(|gm,n|2|hm,n|2 − |ge,n|2|he,n|2)
(|ge,n|2 − |gm,n|2) |hm,n|2|he,n|2 , P
thi
sn . (A.3)
If |gm,n|2|hm,n|2 − |ge,n|2|he,n|2 > 0, Psn should be
above certain threshold P thisn as mentioned in (A.3). If|gm,n|2|hm,n|2 − |ge,n|2|he,n|2 < 0, P thisn becomes negative,
which means that the secure rate can be improved for any
Psn > 0. Thus, under certain channel conditions and certain
source power and jammer power constraints the secure rate of
a user can be improved over a subcarrier. Note that, in order to
have positive secure rate improvement, the jammer power Pjn
should be below certain threshold P thijn as described in (A.1).
The secure rate with jammer is equal to the secure rate without
jammer at Pjn = 0 and Pjn = P
thi
jn
, and in between these
two extremes there is a secure rate improvement. Intuitively it
indicates the presence of a maxima as described below.
From (1) first derivative of Rm,n with respect to Pjn is:
δRm,n
δPjn
=
1
ln 2
 −Psn |hm,n|2|gm,n|2(σ2+Pjn |gm,n|2)2
1 +
Psn |hm,n|2
σ2+Pjn |gm,n|2
−
−Psn |he,n|2|ge,n|2
(σ2+Pjn |ge,n|2)2
1 +
Psn |he,n|2
σ2+Pjn |ge,n|2
 .
Simplifying it further we get,
δRm,n
δPjn
=
[
Psn |he,n|2|ge,n|2
(σ2 + Pjn |ge,n|2) (σ2 + Pjn |ge,n|2 + Psn |he,n|2)
− Psn |hm,n|
2|gm,n|2
(σ2 + Pjn |gm,n|2) (σ2 + Pjn |gm,n|2 + Psn |hm,n|2)
]
1
ln 2
.
The derivative has a quadratic in numerator and a fourth-
order equation of Pjn with all positive coefficients in the
denominator. Hence, the denominator is always positive when
Pjn > 0. Setting the derivative equal to zero, we obtain a
quadratic equation of the form xnP 2jn + ynPjn + zn = 0 with
the following coefficients:
xn = |gm,n|2|ge,n|2
(|gm,n|2|he,n|2 − |ge,n|2|hm,n|2) (A.4)
yn = 2σ
2|gm,n|2|ge,n|2
(|he,n|2 − |hm,n|2) (A.5)
zn = σ
2Psn |hm,n|2|he,n|2
(|ge,n|2 − |gm,n|2)
+ σ4
(|ge,n|2|he,n|2 − |gm,n|2|hm,n|2) (A.6)
The rate improvement scenario, i.e., |hm,n|2 > |he,n|2 and
|ge,n|2 > |gm,n|2, results in xn < 0, yn < 0, and zn > 0.
Since the discriminant ∆n =
√
y2n − 4xnzn is positive,
and xn and zn have opposite signs, there exists only one
positive real root of the above quadratic equation. Thus, the
derivative δRm,nδPjn has only one zero crossing in Pjn > 0 which
corresponds to a unique maxima of rate Rm,n with respect
to jammer power Pjn . The optimum jammer power (P
o
jn
)
achieving maximum secure rate is obtained as the positive
real root of the above quadratic equation. Observing (A.4) to
(A.6), we note that P ojn is an increasing function of Psn
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION IV.1
The condition of subcarrier snatching for user m from user
e is to achieve positive secure rate over subcarrier n, i.e.,
log2
(
1 + γ′m,n
)− log2 (1 + γ′e,n) > 0 (B.1)
Simplifying above equation we have
Psn |hm,n|2
σ2 + Pjn |gm,n|2
>
Psn |he,n|2
σ2 + Pjn |ge,n|2
(B.2)
which gives the following constraint over jammer power Pjn
Pjn
(|ge,n|2|hm,n|2 − |gm,n|2|he,n|2)
> σ2
(|he,n|2 − |hm,n|2) . (B.3)
Since |hm,n|2 < |he,n|2, if |ge,n|2 > |gm,n|2 such that
|ge,n|2|hm,n|2 > |gm,n|2|he,n|2, then left hand side of (B.3)
is positive and the jammer power is constrained as
Pjn >
σ2
(|he,n|2 − |hm,n|2)
|ge,n|2|hm,n|2 − |gm,n|2|he,n|2 , P
ths
jn
. (B.4)
In case |ge,n|2|hm,n|2 < |gm,n|2|he,n|2, then the left hand
side in (B.3) becomes negative. Since the inequality cannot be
satisfied for any positive jammer power, the jammer cannot be
utilized to snatch the subcarrier in such channel conditions.
Further, if |ge,n|2 < |gm,n|2, then also |ge,n|2|hm,n|2 <
|gm,n|2|he,n|2, and thus using the same argument as above,
jammer cannot help in snatching the subcarrier.
Let us refer to the equations (A.4) to (A.6), which are the
coefficients of the quadratic equation obtained after setting
δRm,n
δPjn
= 0. Under the subcarrier snatching scenario, we have
|hm,n|2 < |he,n|2, |ge,n|2 > |gm,n|2, and |ge,n|2|hm,n|2 >
|gm,n|2|he,n|2, which cause xn < 0, yn > 0, and zn > 0.
These conditions indicate the existence of a positive real root,
which corresponds to the optimal jammer power P ojn required
to achieve maximum secure rate over the snatched subcarrier.
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